A private-key cryptosystem may be viewed as a means by which a trusted dealer privately conveys a large, shared pseudo-random object to a pair of players, using little communication. Alternatively, the messages distributed by the dealer may be viewed as a secure compression of a pair of large identical random pads (or random functions) into a shorter shared "key" or "seed". We pose the question of extending this compression problem to more general correlation patterns among several players. Unlike the simple case of identical pads, where the main security concern is with respect to external eavesdroppers, in the case of general correlations participants also have to be protected from each other. That is, collusions of computationally-bounded players should gain no additional knowledge about the joint pads of the remaining players from the compressed messages they receive, other than what follows from the pads they generate and from knowing the joint distribution of all pads. While this ideal requirement is inherently impossible to meet using little communication, it turns out that it can be approximated to a satisfactory level, allowing to securely use such compressed correlated pads in a wide class of protocols. We propose a simple and modular replication-based approach for securely compressing any linear correlation pattern, using pseudo-random generators or pseudo-random functions in a black-box manner. Applications include amortizing the communication costs of private multi-party computation and proactive secret-sharing of large secrets.
Introduction
This work introduces and studies a natural generalization of the fundamental notions of pseudo-randomness (cf. [28, 6, 12, 18] ) to a useful and natural notion of privately correlated pseudo-randomness. Alternatively, our generalized notion may be viewed as providing a secure mechanism for compressing large correlated pads used as resources in cryptographic protocols.
Motivation
We consider a scenario in which a trusted dealer wishes to aid a group of players in performing some cryptographic task by supplying them with a resource of correlated messages. For instance, the dealer may allow a pair of players to communicate with unconditional secrecy by sending them a sufficiently long shared random one-time pad, or allow all players to form a secure multicast group by sending to all of them the same random pad.
As a second and slightly more sophisticated example, the dealer may aid the players to privately compute the modular sum of their inputs by granting them otherwise-random pads that add up to 0. Then, if each player adds his pad to his input and broadcasts the result, the broadcasted messages reveal no information about individual inputs other than their sum. Moreover, even collusions of players cannot learn from their view additional information about inputs of other players other than what follows from their inputs and the outcome of the computation (namely, the sum of all inputs).
The above solutions to the problems of secure communication and private addition possess several nice properties. First, they provide information theoretic security. Second, they are conceptually simple and computationally superefficient. Finally, they induce no on-line communication overhead: all extra communication is concentrated in an off-line distribution stage. Then, why aren't these solutions practical?
An obvious and prohibitive disadvantage of these solutions is their off-line communication cost.
1 Indeed, to maintain information theoretic security, each pad distributed by the dealer can only be used to mask a message of the same size; thus, if the players wish to encrypt long messages or perform many private additions, the dealer has to communicate sufficiently long pads. Even if we assume totally secure communication during the off-line distribution stage, the burden on the dealer would become unmanageable.
For the first example above, namely distributing a long shared random pad to two or more players, there is a standard way of reducing the off-line communication. The long shared pad may be replaced by a "compressed capsule" in the form of a seed to a pseudo-random generator or a key of a pseudo-random function. Such a seed or key may be "uncompressed" by the players holding it to obtain a large shared pseudo-random object which cannot be distinguished from a truly random object by external observers. However, for the second example of correlated pads which sum up to zero there seems to be no standard compression method.
Let us see why some simple approaches towards compressing the second kind of correlation fail. First, observe that if the same seed is sent to all players, it may be uncompressed to yield a distribution which is indistinguishable (by an external observers) from the one to be generated. However, such a solution totally fails to protect the privacy of players from each other: using this seed, each player will be able to recover the inputs of the other players from the broadcasted messages. A second attempt is to try to construct a pseudo-random generator such that given independently chosen seeds s 1 , . . . , s n−1 , it is always possible to find a last seed s n such that the expansions of all seeds add up to (a long) zero. However, no such pseudo-random generator exists, as this would imply that its image forms a linear space.
In this work we pose the question of compressing more general correlation patterns and study the special case of linear correlations, where the pads form a random vector in a linear space.
How to Share a Zero. As paradoxical as this notion may sound, "secretly sharing a zero" among several players (i.e., using a secret-sharing scheme with the secret set to zero) is a common ingredient in cryptographic protocols. One example is the abovementioned application of privately computing the sum of n inputs. More generally, privately computing linear combinations of inputs is an essential subprotocol in general private multi-party protocols (e.g., [5, 9] ). But perhaps a better example is that of proactive secret-sharing and proactive multiparty computation (cf. [24, 13, 26] ), where security has to be preserved over time against a mobile attack. In such applications, a shared representation of zero is periodically generated, either by an external dealer or by the players themselves, for the purpose of refreshing the distributed representation of some shared secret without changing its value. When the secret is very long, as may be the case when proactively sharing a large file, an expensive sharing of a "long zero" is required. One approach towards solving this problem (in the spirit of [17] ) is to disperse an encryption of the large file among the players (without secrecy), and proactively share the short encryption key. However, a straightforward implementation of such a solution does not allow to retrieve or update a portion of the shared file without compromising the secrecy of the key. Moreover, some applications (e.g., protocols from [23] ) crucially rely on the assumption that a non-encrypted representation of the entire file is shared using some simple linear secret-sharing scheme.
The above discussion motivates the problem of secretly sharing a "long zero" in a communication efficient way. While secret-sharing an arbitrary secret cannot use less communication than the length of the secret, it turns out that a shared long zero can be compressed.
Results
We focus on the case of linear correlations, where the pads form a random vector in a linear space. Moreover, while some of our results can be easily pushed to more adversarial scenarios, we adhere to a minimalistic model of an honest dealer and a passive adversary, keeping the problem as clean as possible.
We start by studying the information theoretic problem of private correlation from replication. This problem is motivated by its suitability for replacing perfect randomness with pseudo-randomness in a black-box manner. The setting is as follows. A dealer generates several independent random messages X j , 1 ≤ j ≤ m, and replicates them among n players (i.e., sends each message to a prescribed subset of the players). Then, each player P i performs some local computation on the messages he received, resulting in some output value Y i . We say that such a protocol privately generates a distribution D from replication, if: (1) the outputs (Y 1 , . . . , Y n ) are distributed according to D; and (2) each collusion of players cannot learn from the messages X j they receive any additional information about (Y 1 , . . . , Y n ) other than what follows from their outputs.
We obtain the following results:
• For the case of additively sharing a zero, we obtain an optimal 2 scheme with n 2 messages, each sent to 2 players. This result is refined to privacy with respect to generalized adversary structures 3 (in which privacy should only be maintained with respect to specified collusions), by reducing the problem to an interesting extremal graph-theoretic question. This refined result, in turn, has application to the construction of communicationand round-efficient (information theoretically) private protocols computing modular sum relative to general adversary structures.
• For any linear correlation, uniform over some linear space V , we obtain an optimal scheme whose complexity is proportional to the number of vectors in V with minimal support sets. For some linear spaces (such as the one corresponding to sharing a zero using Shamir's (n/2, n)-threshold secretsharing scheme [27] ), the complexity of this solution will be exponential in the number of players.
We then address the possibility of replacing the random independent sources X j by random independent seeds to a pseudo-random generator, thereby allowing to privately generate large correlated pseudo-pads using little communication. We show that while such a substitution cannot always preserve the security of an underlying information theoretically secure protocol, for a wide class of protocols meeting some mild technical requirement security is guaranteed to be preserved.
A major disadvantage of most of our solutions is their poor scalability; in some applications their complexity grows exponentially with the number of players. 4 However, when the number of players is reasonably small, the advantages of our approach arguably outweigh this unfortunate byproduct of the replication paradigm. One such advantage is the ability to use any block-or stream-cipher in a black-box manner, which may result in orders of magnitudes of efficiency improvement over potential solutions based on specific number-theoretic constructions. Finally, we stress that the task of uncompressing correlated pads may be done off-line. This means that the on-line efficiency of protocols using our correlated pseudo-pads can be the same as the efficiency of protocols using perfect pads. For instance, suppose that a proactive secret-sharing protocol requires a large file to be shared using Shamir's secret-sharing scheme (for efficient on-line retrieval or updates of selected information). In each refreshment period correlated pseudo-pads are uncompressed and "added" to the current shares, and their seeds are erased. At the end of such a refreshment process, portions of the shared file may be freely reconstructed or updated without any additional communication or computation overhead.
We finally note that while the main setting we consider when describing applications involves a trusted dealer, this is not an essential assumption. In fact, assuming that the players are honest but curious, the replication paradigm allows simulating the dealer by the players with no extra cost.
Related Work
The idea of treating correlated pads as useful cryptographic resources has been recently put forward in [3] under a specialized "commodity-based" model, and is implicit in many other works. However, to our knowledge the idea of compressing such general resources has never been treated.
Our paradigm of realizing private correlation via replication is related to the notion of replication-based secret-sharing schemes, which were introduced in [16] as a means of implementing secret-sharing relative to general access structures. Such schemes proceed by first additively sharing a secret, writing it as the sum (over a finite group) of otherwise random shares, and then distributing each additive share to some set of players associated with it. Replication-based secretsharing schemes are implicitly used in [21, 22] in the related context of sharing pseudo-random functions, and are used in [4] to realize private computation relative to general adversary structures and in [15] for obtaining efficient private information retrieval schemes. Some special cases of our constructions resemble (and in a sense generalize) the secret-sharing schemes used in these works; in general, however, both the semantics of the problem studied in this work and the replication-based combinatorial structures which underly our solutions are quite different. Our approach for compressing linear correlations may be viewed as a further, differently motivated, application of the replication technique.
Organization. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces some general notation. In Section 3 we define the information theoretic notion of private correlation from replication and study it for linear correlation patterns. In Section 4 we use the results of Section 3 to obtain privately correlated pseudorandom generators. Section 5 contains some concluding remarks. Finally, the appendices contain some definitions and a proof deferred from the main body of text.
Notation
By [n] we denote the set {1, 2, . . ., n}. We use capital letters to denote random variables or probability distributions, and small letters to denote their instances. By x ← X we denote a random choice of an instance x from the distribution X. All such random choices are made independently of each other. Additional context-specific notation will be defined in subsequent sections.
The Information Theoretic Setting: Private Correlation from Replication
In this section we study the information theoretic question of privately generating a joint distribution of correlated outputs from replicated independent random sources. This question is motivated by the possibility of replacing the independent random sources by seeds to a pseudo-random generator or a pseudo-random function, which will be explored in the next section. A formal definition of this notion of private correlation from replication is given in the following subsection.
Definitions
Let X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X m be independent random variables, where each X j is uniformly distributed over a finite domain X j , let X = (X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X m ) and
. . , Y n be some finite sets, and
denote the set of arguments on which f i depends (e.g., if f 3 (x 1 , . . . , x m ) depends on x 2 and x 5 and only on these arguments, then S 3 = {2, 5}). Finally, we let f = (f 1 , . . . , f n ) (so that f maps from X to Y), and for 1 ≤ i ≤ n we define the random variable
Before proceeding with the main definition, we briefly describe the correspondence between the above notation and the correlation from replication paradigm that motivates it. The random variables X j are the independent random sources to be replicated among the n players. The function f (and its associated sets S i ) induces the following pad distribution protocol:
• The dealer generates x ← X and sends to each player P i , 1 ≤ i ≤ n, all components x j with j ∈ S i . • Each player P i locally computes y i = f i (x) based on the components of x he received, 5 and outputs y i as his random pad.
Notice that the function f concisely defines the entire protocol, including both the identity of messages sent to each player and the local computations of all players.
The random variable Y T includes the joint outputs of the players P i , i ∈ T , and X T includes all messages they receive from the dealer.
We are now ready to define the notion of privately generating a given probability distribution from replicated independent sources.
Definition 1. Let D be a probability distribution over Y, and T ⊆ 2
[n] be an adversary structure (specifying collusions of players to protect against). We say that a mapping f as above T -privately generates D from replication of X (or T -privately generates D for short) if the following two conditions hold: 
Privacy. For any collusion T ∈ T , the random variable Y is independent of X
T given Y T ; that is, for any x ∈ X , Pr[Y = y | X T = x T , Y T = y T ] = Pr[Y = y | Y T = y T ],
Additively Sharing a Zero
Before proceeding to study the general case of linear correlations, we start with the important special case of additively sharing a zero. Since the basic solution we provide for this special case will be generalized in the next subsection, we allow ourselves to omit some formal proofs and focus on the high-level intuition. Moreover, while in the general case we mainly address the question of constructing fully-private correlation generators, for the special case of additively sharing a zero we pay more attention to realizing privacy with respect to threshold and non-threshold adversary structures, and reduce the latter question to an interesting extremal graph-theoretic problem. Fix a finite field F , 6 and define the distribution D s as the uniform distribution over all n-tuples
We first address the case of generating D s with full privacy, and then proceed to study more general adversary structures.
To privately generate D s from replication, consider the clique K n whose n vertices are labeled by player indices, and assign an independent random source X e to each edge e = {u, v} in the graph. That is, let m = n 2 , and label the m entries of X by edge names. Moreover, assume that the edges of the graph are arbitrarily directed (e.g., from the smaller numbered vertex to the larger one). Such a directed version of K n , and similarly of any other graph, induces the following scheme for generating D s : Each player P i receives all sources X e such that e is incident to its corresponding vertex, and outputs the difference
It can be easily verified that any such graph-based scheme satisfies the correctness requirement, since the contribution of each edge to the sum n i=1 f i is 0. An obvious necessary condition for the privacy requirement is that each collusion T of at most n − 2 players misses at least one source X e ; otherwise, the variables X e held by such a collusion would completely determine the joint output Y , contradicting the privacy requirement. Indeed, this condition is met by the above clique-based scheme since each such player set T misses at least one edge. This necessary condition also shows that the complexity of the clique-based solution is optimal under our replication paradigm. This is argued as follows. For each collusion T containing exactly n − 2 players, there must exist a source X j (on which f depends) which T misses; moreover, X j must be distributed to both players outside T , for otherwise the correctness requirement prevents f from depending on X j . It follows that for each set T of size n − 2 there exists a unique source X j it misses, from which it follows that m ≥ n 2 . In the case of full privacy, it turns out that the above necessary condition for privacy is also sufficient; however, as the following example shows, this is not the case for other adversary structures.
Example 1.
Consider the replication scheme induced by a cycle of length n (whose edges are arbitrarily directed, as in the above case of a clique). Such a scheme satisfies the correctness requirement, and also satisfies the above necessary condition for privacy for |T | < n/2. Indeed, every set of less than n/2 vertices cannot cover all edges of the cycle. However, it is easy to see that there exist collusions of two players which can totally determine the output of a third player, thereby violating the privacy condition of Definition 1. For instance, in the scheme induced by the cycle (P 1 , P 2 , P 3 , . . . , P 1 ), P 1 and P 3 can determine the output of P 2 since they cover all edges incident to him.
A necessary and sufficient condition for privacy should assert that for any collusion T ∈ T , the dimension of the space of possible Y values given X T is exactly n − |T | − 1, the dimension of Y given Y T . Intuitively, each of these two dimensions corresponds to the number of "degrees of freedom" of the outputs of the remaining players given a view of members of T . The analysis in the next subsection (or the proof sketch of the following theorem) will show that the above condition is indeed satisfied by the clique-based scheme.
We now reduce the problem of T -privately generating additive shares of zero to an extremal graph theoretic problem. Proof sketch. The proof follows from the fact that the rank of the incidence matrix 8 of a graph equals its number of vertices minus its number of connected components (cf. [7, page 38] ). This implies that if T does not disconnect G, then 7 Note that the above requirement on the subgraphs G − T is not monotone with respect to T (i.e., it is possible that T ⊆ T yet only the removal of T disconnects G). 8 The incidence matrix of a graph G(V, E) is a |V | × |E| matrix M , such that for any edge e = {u, v} ∈ E the e-th column of M contains 1 in its u-th entry, −1 in its v-th entry (or vice versa) and 0 elsewhere.
the dimension of the space of possible Y values given X T is exactly n − |T | − 1 as required, and otherwise it is smaller. The above connectivity requirement illuminates a qualitative difference between the type of combinatorial structures considered in our context and the ones required in the related context of replication-based secret-sharing [16, 21] . Crudely speaking, the latter context only induces covering-type requirements on restricted unions of replication sets, which in our context are generally not sufficient (as demonstrated by Example 1).
For the special case of threshold structures, Theorem 1 suggests that a tprivate generator of D s can be based on any (t+1)-connected graph. For instance, when t is odd, a corresponding optimal graph may be obtained by connecting each vertex i to the (t + 1)/2 vertices with (cyclically) consecutive indices.
We end this subsection by mentioning a further application of the above graph-theoretic characterization. By letting the players simulate the dealer (e.g., having each replicated source be picked and multicast by one player to which it is assigned), the above results can be used to obtain communication-efficient, perfectly-private two-round protocols for modular addition relative to general adversary structures. For the case of threshold structures, this can be compared with the (communication-optimal) private protocol of [10] , which is only slightly more communication-efficient but requires many rounds of interaction.
Optimal Construction for Linear Correlations
We now move to the general case of linear correlations, where the joint output distribution D forms a uniformly random vector in some linear space over a finite field F . In the following we will stick to coding theory terminology: we will refer to the linear space as a linear code, and to a vector in this space as a codeword. To simplify notation, we only address the case where D is uniformly distributed over some length-n linear code C ⊆ F n ; that is, we focus on generating probability distributions in which each player P i outputs the i-th coordinate of a uniformly random codeword c ∈ C. More general linear correlations, in which each player outputs several coordinates of a random codeword c, can be handled in a similar fashion.
Let D C denote the uniform distribution over C. We will privately generate the distribution D C using a linear generator of the form f(x) = M x, where M is an n-row matrix over F . Note that in order to satisfy the correctness requirement alone, it suffices for the columns of M to generate the code C. This is not sufficient, however, for satisfying the privacy requirement. For instance, if M contains only nonzero entries, then each player views all of X and hence obtains full information on Y .
Our construction of a private generator for D C will use a notion of minimal support codewords. For any codeword c ∈ C we define the support set of c, denoted s(c), as the set of coordinates i such that c i = 0. We say that a codeword c is of minimal support, if c = 0 and there is no c ∈ C, c = 0, such that s(c ) ⊂ s(c). It is straightforward to observe that if two codewords c, c are both of minimal support and s(c) = s(c ), then one must be a multiple of the other (otherwise there exists a linear combination of c, c whose support contradicts their minimality). Hence the set of minimal support codewords in C can be naturally partitioned into equivalence classes, where two minimal support codewords are equivalent if one is a multiple of the other. Finally, we define Min(C) as a set of representatives of the above equivalence classes (e.g., Min(C) may include all minimal support codewords whose first nonzero coordinate is 1).
The following theorem gives our construction of a private linear correlation generator.
Theorem 2. Let C be a length-n linear code over F , and M be an n×m matrix whose m columns consist of all codewords in Min(C) (i.e., all representatives of minimal-support codewords in C). Then, the linear function f
The proof of Theorem 2 uses the following sequence of lemmas. The (straightforward) proofs of the first two lemmas are omitted from this version. 
Proof sketch. Let [Y |x T ] and [Y |y
T ] denote the supports of the corresponding spaces (i.e., the sets of y ∈ F n that have nonzero probability). First, writing the corresponding systems of linear equations, it is easy to observe that both spaces are uniformly distributed over some affine subspace of C. Hence, it suffices to show that the supports of the two spaces are equal, i.e. that [
Let C T denote the subspace of C consisting of all codewords c such that c T = 0, and M T denote the submatrix of M containing the rows with indices from T = [n] \ T , restricted to columns from C T (whose T -rows are all zero). That is, write M as
where the rows of M 1 are those labeled by members of T , and every column of 
It follows from the definitions of M and M T that the columns of M T (augmented with zeros as their T -entries) include all codewords in Min(C T ). By Lemma 1 these columns span C T , hence dim C T = rank M T , and using equations (1), (2) above we obtain that dim
It follows from Lemma 3 that the function f M defined in Theorem 2 also satisfies the privacy requirement with respect to any collusion T ⊆ [n], concluding the proof of Theorem 2.
The (fully-private) solution for additively sharing a zero, as described in the previous subsection, may be derived as a special case of Theorem 2. Another useful special case is a secret-sharing of zero using Shamir's scheme. , where each of the m independent field elements is sent to n − t + 1 players.
Corollary 1. Let D be the distribution induced by sharing 0 according to Shamir's secret-sharing scheme with parameters (t + 1, n) over a finite field F (|F | > n). That is, D is generated by picking a random polynomial
Proof. It is not hard to observe that a distribution D as above is uniform over a linear code C such that Min(C) includes n t−1 codewords, each of Hamming weight n − t + 1. More generally, the same is true for any MDS code (cf. [19] ) of length n and dimension t.
We end this section with a couple of remarks about the above construction.
Remarks:
1. On optimality. The construction of the correlation generator f M in Theorem 2 can be shown to be optimal (under the correlation from replication paradigm), with respect to the communication complexity of the induced protocol. The proof of this fact may proceed similarly to the arguments made in the previous subsection for the special case of additively sharing a zero, and is omitted from this version. 2. On generalization to T -privacy. The above solution can be made more efficient if the full privacy requirement is relaxed to T -privacy. In fact, it is possible to derive from the proof of Theorem 2 a generalization of Theorem 1, providing a necessary and sufficient condition on a subset of the columns of M so that the corresponding submatrix M will T -privately generate the distribution D C . Specifically, the relaxed privacy requirement should assert that for every T ∈ T , dim C T = rank M T , where C T and M T are as defined in the proof of Lemma 3.
The Computational Setting: Privately Correlated Pseudo-Random Generators
In this section we exploit private correlation generators constructed in the previous section for implementing "privately-correlated pseudo-random generators". Intuitively, such generators should allow to securely substitute in applications long correlated perfectly-random pads by correlated pseudo-random pads, where these "pseudo-pads" are generated by locally uncompressing short seeds sent by the dealer. While the results shown in this section are not particularly strong, clean, nor elegant, we view them as an important demonstration of plausibility. We start by addressing the delicate issue of formally defining the desired computational notion. A first (and technical) difficulty with incorporating the results of the previous section in a computational setting is the fact that for certain linear correlation patterns, the complexity of their generation from replication is exponential in n. (We stress though that for some useful correlations, such as additive shares of zero, this is not the case.) For simplicity, throughout the remainder of this section we fix a linear distribution D (which in particular determines the number of players n and the size of the field F to be constants), and treat the number of generated instances of D (corresponding to the length of the generated pads) as the major complexity parameter. While this "resolves" the above technical difficulty, a more inherent difficulty is discussed below.
The previous section described a procedure for privately generating a joint distribution D of n correlated pads from m independent and replicated random sources. Such a procedure may be defined using a more general terminology of private multi-party computation (cf. [8, 1, 20] ) as follows. We consider a simple model consisting of n parties, connected to a trusted dealer via secure channels, and a passive, static T -adversary. The function f is a T -private generator for the distribution D (as defined in Definition 1) if it induces a perfectly T -private protocol computing the probabilistic n-output function that takes no inputs and outputs an n-tuple y distributed according to D. 9 Now, a natural way to define the notion of privately-correlated pseudo-random generators using general terminology of private multi-party computation is the following. Let denote the number of repetitions of the distribution D to be generated. The parameter , as well as a security parameter κ, will be given as inputs to all players. Moreover, to simplify definitions we assume that = p(κ) for some polynomial p(κ) = ω(k); that is, the length of the generated pads is some fixed superlinear polynomial of the security parameter. The distribution D on F n induces a distribution D on (F ) n , generated by independent repetitions of D. Notice that the information theoretic constructions of the previous section easily generalize from privately generating a distribution D to privately generating D . Using the above notation, we would like to define a privately-correlated pseudo-random generator as a computationally private protocol 10 computing the probabilistic function outputting D (with no input), or some distribution which is indistinguishable from D , using little communication. Specifically, we restrict the length of messages sent from the dealer to the players to be O(κ).
Such a definition would not only be natural but also quite useful, since it gives hope to allow automatically plugging pseudo-pads in every application that uses perfect pads. However, even under our relatively benign adversary model, such a definition would be impossible to meet. To illustrate why this is the case, let n = 2 and consider the simple distribution outputting a pair of identical random strings. Intuitively, any low-communication protocol for computing this distribution will reveal to P 1 a "short explanation" for the output of P 2 (which is with overwhelming probability identical to his own output), whereas if this information could be simulated based on the output of P 1 alone then one could distinguish the output of P 1 from a truly random output. In the example of additively sharing a zero, members of a collusion T will obtain a short explanation for the sum of the outputs of the remaining players (which again, cannot be simulated by viewing the T -outputs alone).
For the reason discussed above, we avoid specifying an explicit definition of the general computational primitive and replace it with an ad hoc definition. Namely, we define a privately-correlated pseudo-random generator with respect to a protocol or a class of protocols. 
Now, let G be a protocol between the dealer and the players (presumably outputting some pseudo-pads approximating D ), with total communication O(κ).
We say that G is a privately-correlated pseudo-random generator (PCPRG) for distribution D with respect to the protocol P if the protocolP obtained by replacing the off-line stage in P by G is computationally T -private. We say that G is a PCPRG for D with respect to a protocol class C, if it is a PCPRG with respect to every P ∈ C.
Using the above terminology, an ordinary pseudo-random generator may be viewed as a PCPRG in which the dealer sends a κ-bit seed to one player, who locally expands it to an -bit pseudo-random string.
We now use the results of the previous section to construct, for any linear correlation D C , a PCPRG G C with respect to a wide class of protocols meeting some mild technical requirement.
Our PCPRG G C for a linear correlation D C is defined in a straightforward manner using the function f M constructed in Theorem 2. Specifically, the protocol proceeds as follows. Let G : {0, 1} κ → F be any pseudo-random generator (i.e., the output of this generator is indistinguishable from a random -tuple over F ). Let S denote a uniform distribution over ({0, 1} κ ) m (S represents a uniform distribution of m independent κ-bit seeds), and let f = f M . In the protocol G C , the dealer first generates a seed vector s ← S, and sends each seed s j to all players P i with j ∈ S i (where the sets S i are determined by the information theoretic generator f as in the previous section). Then, each player P i evaluates s 1 ), . . . , G(s m ) ), using the seeds it received. The -tupleỹ i ∈ F is used as P i 's pseudo-pad.
The next step is to define a general class of protocols P for which G C is a PCPRG generating D C . The following definition will use the notion of simulator as used in definitions of private protocols. We refer the reader to Appendix A for definitions of the relevant notions.
For any perfectly T -private protocol P, such that in the off-line stage of P the dealer distributes pads generated according to D C , we define a protocol P obtained by replacing the original off-line stage by the distribution procedure induced by a corresponding T -private correlation from replication generator f M . (It can be shown that in our setting such P is also perfectly T -private).
Definition 3.
We say that the protocol P admits a strong simulator, if for every adversary A there exists a strong simulator S following the following two-step procedure:
• Generates, independently of its view of the inputs and the outputs, a uniformly random x T , representing pads received from the dealer in P , and outputs (the appropriate replication of ) x T as the corresponding part of the simulated view; • Proceeds arbitrarily, possibly relying on the generated view x T in addition to its view of the inputs and outputs.
Theorem 3.
For any linear correlation D C , and any protocol P using D C such that P admits a strong simulator, G C is a PCPRG with respect to P.
Proof. See Appendix B.
We stress that the existence of a strong simulator in the sense of the above definition is a very mild requirement on perfectly private protocols. For instance, the simple information theoretic protocol for modular addition described in the introduction, as well as much more complicated protocols such as an implementation of [5] using linearly correlated pads, satisfy this requirement.
To see why a restriction on the protocol P is at all necessary, consider a simple perfectly-private protocol P in which the dealer first additively shares a long zero among the players, and then each player outputs his share. This protocols computes, with perfect and full privacy, the probabilistic function outputting some distribution D C (namely, additive sharing of zero). However, the corresponding protocol G C is not a PCPRG with respect to P. (Intuitively, members of T can generate a "short explanation", which cannot be efficiently simulated, for the sum of the outputs of the other players.) Indeed, the above protocol P does not admit a strong simulator, since the messages viewed by the adversary during the off-line stage depend on the adversary's view of the output.
We would like to point out a few possible extensions of the results of this section. First, pseudo-random generators can be replaced by pseudo-random functions, thereby obtaining a stronger notion of privately-correlated pseudorandom functions. Second, the dealer may be simulated by the players, resulting in private protocols under a more standard dealer-less model. In the case of a passive adversary, this can be done by picking for each seed distributed by the dealer a single player from the set of players who should receive it, and letting this player generate this seed and multicast it to the appropriate set of players. Finally, while the framework discussed in this section does not apply as is to the proactive secret-sharing application described in the introduction, our compression technique for linear correlations can be securely used in such context.
Concluding Remarks
While the correlation from replication paradigm seems to be the most general one could expect when pseudo-randomness is used in a black-box manner, an interesting open question is that of obtaining more efficient direct constructions for linear correlations and other useful types of correlations. A particularly interesting open problem is that of compressing (non-linear) correlations of the type used in [3] for allowing efficient 2-party oblivious transfer (OT) [25, 11] .
11

A Definitions of Private Computation
In the following we outline definitions of perfect (aka information theoretic) and computational privacy of protocols in our minimalistic model. We refer the interested reader to, e.g., [8] for more general and detailed definitions.
We consider a passive, static adversary, corrupting at the beginning of the computation some set of players T ∈ T (denoted T -players). The view of such an adversary consists of the entire joint view of the T -players. That is, this view includes the inputs and random tapes of the T -players, the messages exchanged between the dealer and T -players during the off-line distribution stage, and all messages exchanged during the on-line stage.
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We let a denote an input n-tuple, and g denote a (deterministic or probabilistic, single-or multi-output) function mapping the input into an output n-tuple denoted z. Notice that if g is deterministic, then a determines z. Otherwise, every input a induces some probability distribution on the output z. For every n-tuple v, v T denotes restriction of v to its T -entries.
Let P be an n-party protocol (presumably computing g). We consider two scenarios. In the real-life scenario, an adversary A is exposed to the view described above induced by an execution of P on some input a. In the ideal-model scenario, an output z ← g(a) is picked, and a simulator S, viewing only a T , z T (modeling what the adversary inevitably learns), has to efficiently "simulate" the real-life view of A given the unknown input a and output z. We denote by exec A (a) the random variable which includes the view of the adversary A on input a, concatenated with the outputs of the remaining players. 13 Similarly, by exec S (a) we denote the random variable including the simulated output of S (on inputs a T , z T ) along with the outputs z T .
We say that P is a perfectly (computationally) T -private protocol computing g if for every efficient adversary A (corrupting some set of players T ∈ T ), there exists an efficient simulator S (corrupting the same set of players), such that the probability ensembles {exec S (a)} a∈A and {exec A (a)} a∈A , are identically distributed (resp., computationally indistinguishable), where A is the (infinite) set of all input n-tuples whose n inputs are of the same length.
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B Proof Sketch of Theorem 3
Recall that the protocolP is the protocol obtained by replacing the off-line stage of P or P by the protocol G C . We prove that if P admits a strong simulator, thenP is computationally private. 12 The assumption that all on-line messages are broadcasted does not compromise generality because of the existence of private channels in the off-line stage. 13 Setting T = ∅, this concatenation will capture the correctness requirement. In the case of multi-output functions, it may also capture the adversary's possibility of learning computational information about the outputs of the remaining players. 14 Note that this definition effectively restricts all inputs to be of the same length and uses the input length as the security parameter.
